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I. INTRODUCTION
On November 1, 2002, Verizon Communications Inc. (“Verizon”)1 petitioned for
writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, asking in part that the Court
decide whether a cause of action exists for monopoly leveraging.2 On March 10,
2003, the United States Supreme Court granted Verizon’s petition.3 Courts have
confronted monopoly leveraging many times throughout the course of the doctrine’s

1

Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 305 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2002),
petition for cert. filed sub nom. Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, LLP, 71 U.S.L.W. 3576 (2002). Verizon assumed this lawsuit after Bell Atlantic
merged with GTE Corporation to form Verizon Communications.
2

The United States Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of whether a cause of action
for monopoly leveraging exists.
3
Verizon Communications, 123 S.Ct. at 1480. The petition was limited to the following
question: Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the District Court’s dismissal of
respondent’s antitrust claims? Id.

235

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2004

1

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

236

[Vol. 51:235

history.4 In doing so, courts have either embraced the theory or flat-out rejected it.
Even in the courts that have embraced the doctrine, however, only a few plaintiffs
have succeeded on the merits.5
Monopoly leveraging is the use of monopoly power in one market as leverage to
obtain a competitive advantage in another market.6 The doctrine was created based
upon courts’ interpretation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which deals with a
single firm’s anticompetitive manipulation of a market. 7 Courts have provided
various approaches in defining what constitutes a cause of action for monopoly
leveraging. 8 Monopoly leveraging, however, cannot be established in any way
without a firm having some pre-existing monopoly power in one market.9 The preexisting monopoly power must then be used in some way by the firm to exact an
anticompetitive outcome in a second market.10 Finally, the outcome in the second
market must result in a competitive advantage for the firm.11
The type of outcome in the second market is where much of the disagreement
lies.12 Circuits that have rejected the doctrine have generally done so because they
believe that a mere competitive advantage falls short of the anticompetitive behavior
the Sherman Act is designed to prohibit.13 As a result of the discrepancy concerning
what kind of anticompetitive behavior the Sherman Act is designed to prohibit, the
Supreme Court needs to set the bar once and for all, so the lower federal courts know
whether the monopoly leveraging doctrine makes the cut.
There are three purposes to this article. One purpose is to demonstrate the circuit
split on the issue of whether a cause of action for monopoly leveraging exists, and
the need for the Supreme Court to decide the issue. To demonstrate the split, this
article will begin with an overview of the Sherman Act. This article will then
discuss the seminal cases. It will, first, discuss the cases in various circuits that have
embraced the doctrine and elaborated on it. Second, this article will analyze the
cases in circuits that rejected the doctrine and focus on their reasons for rejecting the
4

Federal Circuit and District Court of Appeals have encountered the monopoly leveraging
doctrine 122 times.
5
Excluding federal district courts, plaintiff has succeeded in bringing the doctrine in the
federal court of appeals cases of Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.
1979), Kerasotes Mich. Theatres, Inc. v. Nat’l Amusements, Inc., 854 F.2d 135 (6th Cir.
1988), and Key Enters. of Del., Inc. v. Venice Hosp., 919 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), vacated
by, 979 F.2d 806 (11th Cir. 1992), dismissed as moot, 9 F.3d 893 (11th Cir. 1993).
6

Berkey, 603 F.2d at 275.

7

Anthony E. DiResta, “Monopoly Leveraging”: A New Section 2 Challenge for Integrated
Firms, C847 A.L.I-A.B.A. 393, 395 (1993).
8

Id.

9

Id.

10

Id.

11

Id.

12

Gen. Cigar Holdings, Inc. v. Altadis, S.A., 205 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1352-53 (S.D. Fla.
2002).
13

Id. at 1353.
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doctrine. It will also discuss the doctrine in light of two recent cases: Law Offices of
Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atlantic Corp.,14 which has embraced the monopoly
leveraging doctrine, and General Cigar Holdings, Inc. v. Altadis, S.A., which has
rejected the monopoly leveraging doctrine. 15 To demonstrate the need for the
Supreme Court to decide the issue, this article will discuss several Supreme Court
cases that have not only indirectly affected the doctrine, but have also sent mixed
messages concerning its viability.16
The second purpose of this article is to determine the state of the doctrine prior to
the Supreme Court ruling in the Verizon case, and what is required to successfully
bring the cause of action today in the circuits that embrace the doctrine. The final
purpose is to determine how the Supreme Court should rule on the issue of whether a
cause of action exists for monopoly leveraging.
II. THE MONOPOLY LEVERAGING CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. Overview of the Sherman Act
The monopoly leveraging doctrine is based upon Section 2 of the Sherman Act.17
There are two general aims of the Sherman Act. 18 The first aim is generally to
prohibit anticompetitive conduct.19 The second aim is to prohibit market conditions
that are anticompetitive.20
Section 1 of the Act states that “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”21 Because Section 1 focuses
on specific conduct of firms and is expressly limited to conduct that involves at least
two firms,22 its conditions are not implicated in the monopoly leveraging doctrine as
the doctrine deals with conduct of individual firms.23 This article will show how
courts have used Section 1, however, to fight against the validity of the monopoly
leveraging doctrine.24
14

305 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2002), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Verizon Communications
Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 71 U.S.L.W. 3352 (2002).
15

Gen. Cigar Holdings, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 1352.

16

Though the Supreme Court has not decided whether the monopoly leveraging doctrine is
a viable cause of action under section 2 of the Sherman Act, other Supreme Court cases have
indirectly affected the doctrine and pose great significance in determining its survival. See
discussion infra Part III.
17

DiResta, supra note 7, at 397.

18

Id. at 395.

19

Id.

20

Id.

21

15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).

22

DiResta, supra note 7, at 395-96.

23

Id.

24

See Fineman v. Armstrong World Indust., Inc., 980 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 507 U.S. 921 (1993).
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Section 2 focuses on a firm’s manipulation of a market25 by making it unlawful to
“monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations.”26 Each of the activities proscribed in Section
2 has its own elements.27 There are two elements to unlawful monopolization.28
They are: “(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the
willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident.”29 There are three elements of attempted monopolization.30 They are: “(1)
that the defendant has engaged in predatory or anti-competitive conduct with (2) a
specific intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly
power.”31
Congress realized when passing the Sherman Act that it could not possibly
conceive of every type of activity that could effectively constitute monopolization;
and therefore, left Section 2 broad enough to allow it to act as the vehicle for federal
courts to use when adopting common law that targets activity that leads to
monopolization.32 Senator John Sherman of Ohio, who was the chief proponent of
the Sherman Act in the late 19th century, explained, “it is difficult to define in legal
language the precise line between lawful and unlawful combinations. This must be
left for the courts to determine in each particular case.”33 As a result, there is an
expansive common law dealing with activity that leads to monopolization.34 Three
universally-accepted violations, actual monopolization, attempted monopolization,
and conspiracy to monopolize, are stated expressly in Section 2. 35 They have,
however, been expanded by the courts with regard to their elemental applications.36
Monopoly leveraging, on the other hand, is not expressly identified as violative of
Section 2.37 Nevertheless, the courts have found that monopoly leveraging is, under
certain circumstances, a violation thereof.38
25

DiResta, supra note 7, at 396.

26

15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).

27

United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).

28

Id.

29

Id.

30

Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993).

31

Id.

32

DiResta, supra note 7 at 397.

33

James P. Puhala, III, Antitrust Law—Berkey Photo and Alaska Airlines: Different
Approaches to Monopoly Leveraging Claims, 16 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 111 (1994) (quoting
Seantor Sherman).
34

Id.

35

DiResta, supra note 7, at 397.

36

Id.

37

Id.

38

Id.
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B. The Conception of the Monopoly Leveraging Doctrine
The concept of using lawfully-gained monopoly power in one market as a lever
to obtain a competitive advantage in another market was alluded to by the United
States Supreme Court over fifty years ago. 39 Despite its tenuous beginnings,
however, it later emerged into a full-fledged legal doctrine.
The Supreme Court case that suggested the monopoly leveraging doctrine was
United States v. Griffith.40 Here, the Court was faced with movie exhibitors who
originally had theaters in approximately thirty-seven towns; forty-nine percent of
which were competitive with other theaters in their respective towns and fifty-one
percent of which were noncompetitive.41 In the towns that were noncompetitive, the
movie exhibitors operated lawfully-gained monopolies under the scope of the
Sherman Act.42 Five years later, however, the same movie exhibitors had theaters in
approximately eighty-five towns; thirty-eight percent of which were competitive and
sixty-two percent of which were noncompetitive. 43 The strategy of the movie
exhibitors was to use their already-achieved monopoly power to bargain for
exclusive movie distribution rights in towns in which they sought to establish
themselves.44 As a consequence, the exhibitors were able to dramatically increase
the number of markets in which they enjoyed monopoly power.45 The Court held
that their use of monopoly power “to beget monopoly”46 was illegal.47 In addition to
finding that this activity violated Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Court
stated in dictum that “the use of monopoly power, however lawfully acquired, to
foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor, is
unlawful.”48 It additionally proclaimed that “monopoly power, whether lawfully or
unlawfully acquired, may itself constitute an evil and stand condemned under
[Section] 2 [of the Sherman Act].”49 From these broad statements, the theory of
monopoly leveraging was born.50

39
See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948), overruled by Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
40

Id.

41

Id. at 102-03.

42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Griffith, 334 U.S. at 102.

45

Id. at 103.

46

Id. at 108.

47

Id.

48

Id. at 107.

49

Griffith, 334 U.S. at 107.

50

Gen. Cigar Holdings, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 1352. Though not yet an expressly recognized
legal doctrine, monopoly leveraging at this early stage in the game meant there must be some
pre-existing monopoly power. Pre-existing monopoly power must be used in some way to
disrupt competition and gain a competitive advantage, and notably, intent is not required.
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Before it became an expressly-recognized legal doctrine, monopoly leveraging
was mentioned in the broad context afforded by Griffith and in relation to other
antitrust theories.51 In Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp.,52 for example,
the Seventh Circuit discussed the doctrine in the realm of a tying arrangement under
which a manufacturer who enjoyed a monopoly selling electromagnetic
microbalances terminated a dealership when the buyer refused to also purchase the
manufacturer’s millibalances.53 The Seventh Circuit noted that “[t]he possessor of
[a] lawfully acquired monopoly power may not use that power as leverage to deprive
competitors of access to customers, to force customers to maintain resale prices or in
any other coercive manner,” 54 despite the fact that the manufacturer had not
established a monopoly in the second millibalances market. 55 The manufacturer
additionally did not have a reasonable possibility of achieving a monopoly in the
second market.56 Nonetheless, the leveraging of monopoly power through a tying
arrangement, when used to gain a competitive advantage in the second market,
constituted unlawful activity under the Sherman Act.57
The monopoly leveraging doctrine was expressly recognized in the Second
Circuit case of Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.58 The markets involved in
this case were cameras, film, photofinishing equipment and services, and color paper
on which to develop the film.59 Kodak was a competitor in all of these markets, but
it had monopoly power in the camera and film markets, controlling sixty percent and
over eighty percent, respectively.60 Berkey competed with Kodak in several markets
including those of photofinishing equipment and services, and the sale of cameras.61
At the same time, Berkey was a distributor of Kodak products.62 It purchased Kodak
film in addition to other Kodak supplies for the purpose of reselling them to its own
customers.63 In the course of their business relationship, however, Kodak developed
a new and better type of color film, and, rather than introduce it in an existing
format, decided to introduce it in a new 110mm format.64 Kodak then developed a

51

See Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1977).

52

Id.

53

Id. at 704.

54

Id. at 712.

55

Id.

56

Sargent-Welch Scientific, 567 F.2d at 706.

57

Id. at 712.

58

603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).

59

Id. at 269.

60

Id. at 269-70.

61

Id.

62

Id.

63

Berkey, 603 F.2d at 269-70.

64

Id.
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110 Pocket Instamatic camera with which to use the new color film.65 Because the
110mm film would only operate in the Pocket Instamatic camera, Kodak enjoyed a
monopoly in the new film market until competitors, such as Berkey, could develop
their own 110mm camera.66 In addition to other allegations such as tying, Berkey
alleged that Kodak’s monopoly in the 110mm film market gave it an unfair
advantage in the photofinishing equipment and services markets.67 The court noted
that Kodak did not come close to gaining control of the markets and did not attempt
to monopolize them.68
After examining previous decisions such as Griffith, which had not expressly
recognized the doctrine, the Second Circuit affirmatively held for the first time that
“a firm violates section 2 by using its monopoly power in one market to gain a
competitive advantage in another, albeit without an attempt to monopolize the
second market.”69 It further stated that “the competition in the leveraged market may
not be destroyed but merely distorted.”70 The court, however, did not hold that any
competitive advantage would satisfy the doctrine.71 Rather, it provided an example
of behavior that would not satisfy the doctrine.72 “[A] large firm does not violate
section 2 simply by reaping the competitive rewards attributable to its efficient size,
nor does an integrated business offend the Sherman Act whenever one of its
departments benefits from association with a division possessing a monopoly in its
own market.” 73 The court effectively made an exclusion for large firms with
efficient operations. “[C]omplementary products, reduced transaction costs, and so
forth . . . are gains that accrue to any integrated firm, regardless of its market share,
and they cannot by themselves be considered uses of monopoly power.” 74 In
providing this exclusion, it made the task of determining what kinds of monopoly
power are prohibited difficult because that which constitutes the large firm with
efficient operations is largely vague.75
Certainly the doctrine made headway as an expressly-recognized legal doctrine
after Berkey Photo, but because of the newly-created difficulty in determining what
kinds of monopoly power are prohibited under the efficient operations exception, the
doctrine remained in a state of confusion.76

65

Id.

66

Id. at 268.

67

Id. at 267-68.

68

Berkey, 603 F.2d at 275.

69

Id.

70

Id.

71

Id.

72

Id.

73

Berkey, 603 F.2d at 276.

74

Id.

75

Puhala, supra note 33, at 123.

76

Id.
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C. Progression of the Monopoly Leveraging Doctrine
Courts in several circuits accepted the doctrine despite the state in which Berkey
Photo left it. Courts even elaborated upon the principles set forth in Berkey Photo in
order to clear up some of the confusion. The Sixth Circuit adopted the principles set
forth in Berkey Photo and Griffith in Kerasotes Michigan Theatres, Inc. v. National
Amusements, Inc.77 The facts are similar to Griffith. National Amusements alleged
that Kerasotes used its monopoly power as a movie exhibitor outside the region of
Flint, Michigan, as leverage to obtain exclusive exhibition rights of first run films
inside the region of Flint.78 Though National Amusement’s claim was dismissed in
the district court pursuant to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under
Fed. R. Civ. P. § 12(b)(6), the circuit court stated that National Amusement’s
leveraging claim was a viable antitrust cause of action sufficient to defeat such a
motion.79
A man with a monopoly of theatres in any one town commands the
entrance for all films into that area. If he uses that strategic position to
acquire exclusive privileges in a city where he has competitors, he is
employing his monopoly power as a trade weapon against his
competitors.80
The court thereby reinforced the idea that monopoly leveraging is the use of
monopoly power as a lever to gain a competitive advantage in another competitive
market, while confirming that it is not necessary to possess monopoly power or a
dominate market position in the second market.81 It additionally tried to clarify the
Kodak exception by stating that monopoly leveraging occurs when a firm attempts
“to extend a business dominance from one market into a second market, without
having to achieve that dominance in the second market by developing a superior
product or as the result of other legitimate competitive advantages.”82
The monopoly leveraging doctrine was reaffirmed by the Second Circuit in
Grandlight & Supply Co. v. Honeywell, Inc.83 Grandlight alleged that defendant,
Micro Switch, had used its market power in its basic, core-line products to gain a

77

854 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. dismissed sub nom. G.K.C. Mich. Theatres, Inc. v.
Nat’l Amusements, Inc. 490 U.S. 1087 (1989).
78

Id. at 136.

79

Id. at 136. (“We believe National has adequately alleged a viable antitrust cause of
action sufficient at least to defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. Kerasotes' alleged behavior,
using its dominant market position in non-Flint areas to obtain first run films in Flint, which
they would not have been able to obtain in a competitive process, does indeed constitute
‘leveraging,’ which is forbidden by the antitrust laws”). Id.
80

Id. at 137.

81

Id. (“We expressly reject the district court's reasoning that leverage or the abuse of
monopoly power is not actionable when the offender has not yet acquired a dominant position
in the affected market”). Id.
82

Id.

83

771 F.2d 672, 681 (2d Cir. 1985).
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competitive advantage in its ventured line.84 The court, in reaffirming that a cause of
action for monopoly leveraging exists, broke down the claim of monopoly
leveraging into three factors.85 First, there must be some form of monopoly power in
one existing market.86 Second, as seen in Berkey, there must be use of monopoly
power in one market to foreclose competition, gain a competitive advantage, or
destroy a competitor. 87 Third, there must be an injury caused by the conduct. 88
Applying these elements, the court affirmed the district court’s finding that the
plaintiff did not meet its burden of establishing that the defendant used its monopoly
power to gain a competitive advantage.89
The Eleventh Circuit recognized a claim for monopoly leveraging in Key
Enterprises of Delaware, Inc. v. Venice Hospital.90 The facts of the case surrounded
the rental and sale of durable medical equipment in Venice, Florida. 91 Venice
Hospital enjoyed a monopoly in acute care as it had eighty percent of the patient
hospital admissions in Venice, and few Venice area residents would go to
neighboring hospitals outside of Venice.92 A supplier of durable medical equipment
brought a cause of action against the hospital when the hospital implemented a joint
venture with a private corporation, that was also a supplier of durable medical
equipment.93 The joint venture excluded the plaintiff supplier and other competing
vendors from selling their durable medical products to the hospital’s patients.94
The jury concluded, and the circuit court agreed, that Venice Hospital had
intentions of abusing the monopoly power it enjoyed in the acute care market to
exclude competitors from the durable medical equipment market in Venice,
Florida.95 When finding in the affirmative for the monopoly leveraging claim, the
court looked to three factors.96 One, Venice Hospital had a pre-existing monopoly
power in the acute care market.97 Two, the hospital “willfully used that power to
foreclose competition, gain a competitive advantage or destroy a competitor in a

84

Id.

85

Id.

86

Id.

87

Id.

88

Grandlight, 771 F.2d at 681.

89

Id.

90

919 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), vacated 979 F.2d 806 (11th Cir. 1992), dismissed as
moot 9 F.3d 893 (11th Cir. 1993).
91

Id. at 1552.

92

Id. at 1553.

93

Id. at 1553-54.

94

Id. at 1553-54.

95

Venice Hosp., 919 F.2d at 1567.

96

Id.

97

Id.
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different market.”98 Three, as a result of the hospital’s actions the plaintiff supplier of
durable medical equipment was injured in that it was excluded from access to
customers.99
The court focused heavily on the intent requirement, more so than previous cases
that adopted the monopoly leveraging doctrine, and noted that “[t]he key to
distinguishing unlawful monopoly leveraging from lawful competitive advantage
available as a result of integration is intent.”100 It went so far as to provide two ways
in which the plaintiff could properly prove the element of intent.101 The first was
through a showing that the hospital had a conscious objective to leverage its
monopoly power in the acute care market to obtain an unlawful advantage or to
injure other suppliers in the durable medical equipment market.102 This approach,
commonly used to prove intent for other causes of action such as fraud, requires a
high degree of proof as it is difficult to discern one’s conscious objective. The court,
however, provided an alternative approach which required a lesser degree of proof.103
It stated that intent can be established simply by showing that “the unlawful
competitive advantage or injury to competitors in the durable medical equipment
market was the necessary and direct consequence of defendant Venice Hospital’s
conduct or business arrangements.” 104 This approach seems to allow for the
fulfillment of the intent requirement by substituting a showing of a causal connection
between the unlawful leveraging and the plaintiff’s injury.105
In addition to providing a framework for establishing the intent requirement in a
monopoly leveraging analysis, the court reinforced the long-recognized notion that a
firm that enjoys a lawful monopoly is permitted to receive the natural benefits to
which it is entitled.106 The court, however, may have done so at the expense of the
doctrine. After mentioning that a firm may receive those natural benefits, it stated,
“[h]owever, when a party with monopoly power abuses its monopoly power in one
market as a means of gaining an unlawful competitive advantage in and
monopolizing another market, we have no hesitation to conclude that the Sherman
Act prohibits such conduct.”107 That statement may have constituted a blow to the
doctrine if the court really meant the four words “and monopolizing another
market.”108

98

Id.

99

Id.

100

Venice Hosp., 919 F.2d at 1567-68.

101

Id. at 1567.

102

Id.

103

Id.

104

Id.

105

Venice Hosp., 919 F.2d at 1567.

106

Id.

107

Id. at 1568.

108

Id.
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The core idea behind monopoly leveraging is that the firm does not have to
monopolize the second market to offend Section 2 of the Sherman Act. If
monopolization in the second market is required, the leveraging doctrine is narrowed
to the point of being toothless. This is because monopolization in the second market
would require the high degree of anticompetitive behavior that is actionable under
the offense of monopolization. At that level of anticompetitive behavior, the
monopoly leveraging doctrine is not necessary. It would only serve the purpose of
more clearly defining how the firm achieved its monopoly in the second market.
In the Ninth Circuit, the court suggested its concurrence with the doctrine.109 In
M.A.P. Oil Co. v. Texaco Inc.,110 the plaintiff brought an action under Section 2,
asserting that Texaco had monopoly power in the sale of gasoline and used that
power to gain a competitive advantage in a distribution services market.111 Although
the plaintiff’s action failed, because it could not establish that a distribution services
market actually existed,112 the court nevertheless mentioned, when discussing causes
of action under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, that one exists when “a firm... use[s]
its monopoly power in one market to gain an unwarranted competitive advantage in
another.”113 The court at least recognized the monopoly leveraging doctrine.
Four years later, another circuit court in Grason Electric Co. v. Sacramento
Municipal Utility Dist.114 found this language to be a definitive acceptance of the
doctrine when it stated “[t]he Berkey Photo opinion, by virtue of its adopting in
Mapp [sic], seems to have settled the question in this circuit of whether a ‘pure’
monopoly leveraging theory exists.”115
The monopoly leveraging doctrine seemingly reached a level of legitimacy as a
result of the cases that nurtured the doctrine. Missing, however, were any persuasive
reasons from the courts for finding a competitive advantage violative of the Sherman
Act. This left the doors wide open for courts to attack the validity of the doctrine.
D. Rejection of the Monopoly Leveraging Doctrine
Indeed, courts began to attack the validity of the doctrine. The same year that the
Grason Electric Co. decision suggested that the monopoly leveraging doctrine had
been adopted in the Ninth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit began to disavow the doctrine
and what it had said in M.A.P. Oil. 116 In Catlin v. Washington Energy Co., 117
Washington Energy had a lawful monopoly in natural gas distribution, and the
plaintiffs alleged that it used that monopoly power as a leverage to gain advantages
109
Puhala, supra note 33, at 128. The Ninth Circuit soon after changed its mind and is
now the Circuit to most heavily refute the monopoly leveraging doctrine.
110

691 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1982).

111

Id. at 1305.

112

Id. at 1306.

113

Id. at 1305-06.

114

571 F. Supp. 1504, 1516 (E.D. Cal. 1983).

115

Id. at 1516.

116

791 F.2d 1343, 1346 (9th Cir. 1986).

117

Id.
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in a vent damper market by printing advertisements for its vent dampers on billing
envelops that were sent to its gas customers.118 When confronted with the plaintiff’s
argument that the Ninth Circuit adopted the monopoly leveraging theory in M.A.P.
Oil, the court explained that because it did not elaborate on or apply the theory in
M.A.P. Oil and only held that the plaintiffs failed to establish the existence of a
second market, it had not formally adopted the doctrine.119 The court then reinforced
its position by citing two cases in which it had held that more than a mere
competitive advantage in the second market is required for a Section 2 violation.120
In one case it held that a requirement of any Section 2 cause of action is that in the
second market there be “some associated conduct which constitutes an
anticompetitive abuse or leverage of monopoly power... rather than aggressive
competition on the merits.”121 In another case the court held that “[a] firm may not
use its market position as a lever to create a monopoly in another market.”122 The
court additionally questioned whether Berkey Photo intended to create a theory that
prohibited the use of a lawful monopoly to gain any kind of competitive advantage in
a second market, without an attempt to monopolize the second market.123 Although
the court did not expressly reject the doctrine at this point, it essentially declined to
decide whether that doctrine indeed did constitute a separate offense under Section
2.124
Five years after Catlin, the Ninth Circuit used that decision to expressly and
decisively reject the monopoly leveraging doctrine in Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United
Airlines, Inc.125 The case involved American Airlines’ government-approved attempt
to create a computer reservation service with other airlines.126 The plan to create the
service did not succeed, and ultimately, United Airlines and American Airlines
created their own services.127 Other smaller airlines would use these services, and
they did so by paying a per booking rate.128 Because United Airlines and American
Airlines had the two dominating computer reservation services, they effectively
enjoyed a monopoly power in this market.129 In their complaint, the smaller airlines
alleged that the larger airlines, in controlling the computer reservation service
market, engaged in display biasing; advertising their own flights in more desirable
118
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123

791 F.2d at 1346.

124

Id.

125

Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc , 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991).

126

Id. at 538.

127

Id.

128

Id.

129

Id.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol51/iss2/5

12

MONOPOLY LEVERAGING

2004]

247

locations than those of the smaller airlines.130 Therefore, the smaller airlines charged
the larger airlines with monopoly leveraging by using their monopoly power in the
computer reservation services market to gain a competitive advantage in the air
transportation market.131
The court rejected the monopoly leveraging doctrine as established in Berkey and
stated that “a plaintiff cannot establish a violation of Section 2 without proving that
the defendant used its monopoly power in one market to obtain, or attempt to attain,
a monopoly in the downstream, or leveraged, market.” 132 Therefore, the court
concluded that Berkey’s holding that anticompetitive behavior arises from obtaining
a competitive advantage was incorrect.133 After stating that Berkey was incorrect, it
stated in a footnote that Griffith was not applicable either because it dealt with
anticompetitive behavior violative of Section 1, concerted actions.134 Additionally,
in the same footnote, it rejected Kerasotes for the same reason it rejected Berkey.135
The court stated two reasons for rejecting the monopoly leveraging doctrine.136
First, it took a literal approach in interpreting the Sherman Act, not recognizing a
cause of action for behavior that falls short of monopolization or attempted
monopolization. 137 The court explained that the traditional interpretation of the
Sherman Act was to punish “any individual or entity that uses ‘predatory’ means to
attain a monopoly, or to perpetuate a monopoly after the competitive superiority that
originally gave rise to the monopoly has faded.”138 In other words, the court believed
that anticompetitive behavior, chargeable under the Sherman Act, did not arise when
a monopolist uses a lawful monopoly in one market only to achieve a competitive
advantage in a second market.139 The court’s view of the Sherman Act was that
anticompetitive behavior only arises when a firm monopolizes and, at the very least,
when a firm engages in an attempt to monopolize.140
Second, the court maintained that monopoly leveraging did not make a
distinction between lawful and unlawful monopolies, as do causes of action such as
monopolization and attempted monopolization. 141 The court explained that the
Sherman Act only makes unlawful predatory monopolies, not monopolies such as
efficient and natural monopolies.142 Therefore, the court’s argument relied on the
130
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assumption that monopoly leveraging leads to lawful competition. Indeed, it pointed
out that “monopoly leveraging is just one of a number of ways that a monopolist can
permissibly benefit from its position.” 143 The court even compared monopoly
leveraging to the monopolistic behavior of setting high prices in the market in which
the monopolist holds the monopoly.144 The court said that both monopoly leveraging
and setting high prices “represent the cost that we incur when we permit efficient and
natural monopolies.”145 Additionally, the court explained that “[t]he danger that a
lawful monopoly will either create a new monopoly or unduly perpetuate itself is no
more evident when a lawful monopoly is leveraged than when a lawful monopolist
reaps its monopoly profit solely from price increases in the monopoly market.”146
The monopoly leveraging doctrine then suffered a small setback in the Second
Circuit, ten years after it had been born in Berkey Photo.147 In Twin Laboratories,
Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness,148 the court was faced with two companies that
competed in two markets.149 The first was the market for bodybuilding magazines,
and the second was for the production of nutritional supplements for bodybuilders.150
Twinlab published Muscular Development, which had a relatively small circulation
compared to the magazines that Weider published, Muscle & Fitness and Flex,151
which were two leading magazines in the market.152 In the nutritional supplement
market, Twinlab had five to twelve percent of the market share and Weider had ten
to twenty-five percent of the market share.153 As Weider’s magazines were leading
magazines in the market, Twinlab used them as its primary vehicles for
advertisement for several years.154 That ended when Weider refused to deal with
Twinlab and no longer accepted Twinlab’s advertisements.155 As a result, Twinlab
asserted several claims against Weider including a claim for monopoly leveraging.156
The primary claim was a denial of essential facilities; however, within that claim,
Twinlab alleged that Weider used its monopoly power in the magazine market to
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attempt to monopolize the supplement market.157 In refusing to apply the theory it
had established ten years earlier, the court stated that its creation of the monopoly
leveraging theory was done in dictum, as the plaintiff in the earlier case did not raise
the claim.158 Second, the court noted that in Berkey Photo the primary claim was
tying and in Twin Laboratories, Inc. it was a denial of essential facilities.159 Finally,
the court agreed that it alternatively established the doctrine in Berkey Photo, but
noted that the doctrine, as it was established, required “tangible harm to
competition.”160 Since the court found Twinlab to have remained in competition
with Weider, it did not believe that the tangible harm element was established.161
The monopoly leveraging theory took another upset162 in the Third Circuit case of
Fineman v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc.163 Armstrong World Industries was a
leading manufacturer of floor covering products. 164 Distributors of Armstrong’s
floor covering products depended on Armstrong for ninety-five percent of their
business. 165 Fineman’s company, The Industry Network System, Inc. (TINS),
developed a monthly videotape magazine designed for retailers of floor covering
products. 166 Fineman alleged that Armstrong, when about to launch its own
videotape magazine, used its leverage in the floor covering market to coerce its
distributors to refuse to deal with TINS, thereby eliminating TINS in the videotape
market and achieving its own competitive advantage in that second market.167 The
court, however, found that a finding of a competitive advantage was not enough to
warrant action under the Sherman Act.168 Rather, the court held that a plaintiff must
show “threatened or actual monopoly in the leveraged market.”169
The court based its holding on several reasons. First, it took a highly analytical
approach in applying the literal framework of the Sherman Act by focusing on the
differences between Section 1 and Section 2 of the Act.170 To support its approach, it
cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube
Corp.,171 which did not address the monopoly leveraging doctrine, but held that a
157
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company that is wholly owned by another company cannot engage in concerted
action under Section 1.172 A single firm cannot engage in a Section 1 violation
because two firms are required for an unreasonable restraint of trade such as a
concerted action. 173 Additionally, a wholly owned company cannot engage in
concerted action with its parent company as it is essentially one firm.174 As a result,
the Copperweld Court stated that Section 1 “leaves a ‘gap’ in the Act’s prescription
against unreasonable restraints of trade,”175 because Section 1 only targets multiple
firms engaging in unreasonable restraints of trade when a single firm, e.g., one that
engages in monopoly leveraging, can equally engage in such behavior if “it alone
possesses the combined market power of those same two firms.”176
Using the “gap” theory, the Copperweld Court stated that as a result of the fact
that the Sherman Act does not “prohibit unreasonable restraints of trade as such--but
only restraints affected by a contract, combination, or conspiracy--it leaves
untouched a single firm’s anti-competitive conduct (short of threatened
monopolization) that may be indistinguishable in economic effect from the conduct
of two firms subject to Section 1 liability.”177 In other words, the Copperweld Court
reasoned that anti-competitive conduct such as monopoly leveraging really fits under
Section 1, but because it was intentionally left out of Section 1, and because Section
2 expressly prohibits only monopolization and attempted monopolization, there is no
place for a monopoly leveraging violation in the Sherman Act.178 Fineman, based
upon Copperweld, concluded that because of the distinction between Section 1 and
Section 2, the Sherman Act “does not make unlawful the entire universe of anticompetitive conduct” 179 and “[i]t does not proscribe anti-competitive unilateral
conduct that falls shy of threatened monopolization.”180
The second reason, upon which the Fineman court based its decision, dealt with
the conception of the doctrine, and specifically with the procedural posture in
Griffith. 181
In Griffith, the district court did not believe that there was a
demonstration of a conspiracy to restrain trade.182 The Supreme Court, however,
reversed the district court and remanded on the issue of “whether a necessary and
direct result of the master agreements was the restraining or monopolizing of trade
within the meaning of the Sherman Act.”183 As a result, Griffith neither decided
172
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whether the movie theater leveraged its power in one market to gain a competitive
advantage in another market, nor did it determine whether that behavior would be
unlawful.184 Therefore, the court in Fineman stated that the broad statement made in
Griffith should not be controlling.185
Also stressing the invalidly of the monopoly leveraging doctrine was the court in
the recent case of General Cigar Holdings. 186
General Cigar was a cigar
manufacturer based in the United States who brought several antitrust allegations,
including one of monopoly leveraging, against Altadis, S.A., the world’s largest
cigar manufacturer.187 Altadis had a monopoly in the cigar market outside of the
United States, controlling seventy-eight percent of the market. 188 In the United
States, Altadis controlled thirty-nine percent of the market.189 In September 2000,
however, Atladis acquired fifty percent of Corporacion Habanos, which had a
monopoly in the Cuban cigar market.190 General Cigar alleged that Atladis used its
newly found monopoly power in the Cuban cigar market to gain a competitive
advantage in the United States markets.191
Responding to the plaintiff’s monopoly leveraging claim, the court first noted the
circuit split and then rejected the doctrine along with the Third and Ninth Circuits.192
In an extensive analysis, it rejected the doctrine for several reasons. It first embraced
the Supreme Court’s decision in Copperweld, stating that Section 2 liability requires
a threat of monopoly, rather than a competitive advantage.193 “Congress authorized
Sherman Act scrutiny of single firms only when they pose a danger of
monopolization. Judging unilateral conduct in this manner reduces the risk that the
antitrust laws will dampen the competitive zeal of a single aggressive
entrepreneur.” 194
The court also embraced Fineman stating that monopoly
leveraging allows for a violation of Section 2 for “merely ‘unfair’ but nonmonopolistic unilateral activity.”195 It additionally cited Professors Philip E. Areeda
and Herbert Hovenkamp for the proposition that “enlargement of the defendant’s
market share at the plaintiff’s expense or even at the destruction of plaintiffs by
unfair means” does not constitute anticompetitive behavior under Section 2 and
rather “monopoly performance measured by reduced output or higher prices in the
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secondary market” is required. 196 Though Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp
embrace the doctrine and the court in General Cigar Holdings does not, the court
nevertheless cited the Professors’ standard because, again, it raises the bar for
anticompetitive monopoly leveraging conduct as this standard essentially requires
monopolistic effects in the secondary market, not only a competitive advantage.197
Finally, the court embraced the Alaska Airlines argument that the monopoly
leveraging is invalid because it does not make a distinction between lawful and
unlawful monopolies.198
With no persuasive reason why it should exist, the monopoly leveraging doctrine
stood defenseless against the mentioned theories for its rejection. Combining the
theories, taking a literal approach in interpreting the Sherman Act (not recognizing a
cause of action for behavior that falls short of monopolization or attempt to
monopolize), the fact that the monopoly leveraging doctrine does not make a
distinction between lawful and unlawful monopolies, and the Section 1 “gap” theory
established by the Supreme Court in Copperweld, the doctrine was severely
weakened.
III. SUPREME COURT TREMORS
The Supreme Court has yet to directly decide the issue of whether monopoly
leveraging constitutes a valid cause of action under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.199
The Court, however, has made several conflicting statements that indirectly affect
the doctrine.200 The first is that of the Section 1 “gap” theory of Copperweld, which
was used in Fineman as a reason for rejecting the doctrine. The second is found in
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 201 decided a year before
Fineman. The Court stated that it “has held many times that power gained through
some natural and legal advantage such as a patent, copyright, or business acumen can
give rise to liability if ‘a seller exploits his dominant position in one market to
expand his empire into the next.’”202 This language is nearly identical to that of the
monopoly leveraging doctrine. To invoke the monopoly leveraging doctrine, a firm
must use its dominant position in one market to expand itself in the second market.
The statement made in Eastman Kodak, unlike the Section 1 “gap” theory, may
have provided the monopoly leveraging doctrine with support to stand on. A close
examination of the facts of Eastman Kodak, however, shows that the Court’s
statement does not entirely support the theory, at least where the theory only
196
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demands a competitive advantage in the second market. 203 In Eastman Kodak,
Kodak controlled “nearly 100% of the parts market and 80% to 95% of the service
market.”204 Therefore, Kodak willfully used its monopoly power in the parts market
to increase its monopoly share in the service market. 205 Monopoly leveraging
traditionally had not been used in the context of a firm already possessing a
monopoly in the second market; if an increase in monopoly share in the second
market indeed constitutes a competitive advantage, however, then the Supreme
Court’s statement is in line with the monopoly leveraging theory.
The monopoly leveraging doctrine had support for one year until the Supreme
Court released its opinion in Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan.206 In Spectrum
Sports, the Court held that Section 2 “makes the conduct of a single firm unlawful
only when it actually monopolizes or dangerously threatens to do so.” 207 The
monopoly leveraging doctrine suffered greatly under this holding, again, where the
theory only demands a competitive advantage in the second market.208 Requiring a
showing for monopolization or a dangerous attempt to monopolize goes well beyond
the inherent framework of the theory, and only allows for a violation under Section 2
for two causes of action, those of monopolization and attempted monopolization.209
The Court stated that “[t]he purpose of the Act is not to protect businesses from the
working of the market; it is to protect the public from the failure of the market. The
law directs itself not against conduct which is competitive, even severely so, but
against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy competition itself.”210
With the Court’s statement, the issue then becomes what conduct unfairly tends
to destroy competition itself. Given the holding of the case, the Court believed that
the only violations of Section 2 that destroy competition are monopolization and
attempted monopolization. The Supreme Court, however, does not stand alone, as
the court in Davis v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.211 agreed with the
Court’s reasoning in Spectrum Sports. In Davis, the court rejected the plaintiff’s
leveraging theory and stated “[t]he Supreme Court has recently explained that, where
a single firm is involved, monopoly leveraging does not constitute a claim distinct
from monopolization or attempted monopolization.”212
As evidenced by the preceding discussion of Eastman Kodak and Spectrum
Sports, even after the Supreme Court’s review of the doctrine, it is still unclear
whether a cause of action for monopoly leveraging exists. The Supreme Court has
offered conflicting statements on the cause of action, and no clear guidance on the
203
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issue, leaving plaintiffs to wonder whether or not to plead monopoly leveraging at
all. The Court, however, has the opportunity to eliminate the uncertainty by granting
Verizon’s petition for writ of certiorari. The Court must accept this case in order to
delineate the bounds of actionable anticompetitive behavior violative of the Sherman
Act.
IV. STATE OF THE MONOPOLY LEVERAGING DOCTRINE WHEN
VERIZON PETITIONED FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Because there is a circuit split on the issue of whether a cause of action for
monopoly leveraging exists and in what form, whether the firm’s conduct is
actionable largely depends upon the circuit in which the firm is charged with
leveraging its monopoly power. An examination of the totality of the circuits and
their various approaches to the doctrine reveals that three types of monopoly
leveraging exist today.213 A further examination will show how to succeed on the
traditional monopoly leveraging theory.
A. Three Types of Monopoly Leveraging
The first type of monopoly leveraging is when a monopolist uses its monopoly
power in one market to monopolize another market. 214 This type is universally
accepted by all circuits, including those that reject the traditional theory. 215 The
reason this type is universally accepted is because the theory combines the
leveraging principle with the well established cause of action for unlawful
monopolization, found in the text of Section 2 itself.216
The second type of monopoly leveraging that exists today is when a monopolist
uses its monopoly power in one market to attempt to monopolize another market.217
Similar to the first type of monopoly leveraging, this theory rests on the wellestablished cause of action for attempted monopolization, also found in the text of
Section 2.218 This type is also universally accepted in the courts.219
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The third type of monopoly leveraging that exists today is the traditional one
established in Berkey Photo, where a monopolist leverages its monopoly power in
one market to gain a competitive advantage in another market.220 Again, this is
where the circuit split lies. When a firm engages in monopoly leveraging gaining
only a competitive advantage in the secondary market, and a plaintiff brings a cause
of action in the Ninth and Third Circuits, its conduct will not be actionable under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act as these Circuits have rejected the idea of an
anticompetitive-competitive advantage. 221 Conversely, when a plaintiff brings a
cause of action for monopoly leveraging in the Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits,
its conduct will be actionable under Section 2.222 A major caveat, however, is that in
the entire history of the monopoly leveraging doctrine, plaintiffs have successfully
brought the cause of action only a few times.223 It is paradoxical that courts have
rejected the doctrine because it sets too low a bar for anticompetitive behavior, when
plaintiffs have succeeded in meeting its anticompetitive bar in only a few cases
throughout the course of its history.
B. How to Succeed on the Traditional Monopoly Leveraging Theory
Succeeding in a cause of action in monopoly leveraging is more difficult than
courts in the Ninth and Third Circuits describe because of the many conditions that
must be met to establish the doctrine. Courts in the Second, Sixth, and Seventh
Circuits first require proof of the three basic factors succinctly stated in Grand Light
& Supply Co. v. Honeywell, Inc.224 One, there must be monopoly power in one
market.225 Two, the use of that power, however lawfully acquired, must foreclose
competition, give the firm a competitive advantage, or destroy a competitor in a
secondary market.226 Three, there must be injury caused by the conduct.227 Not only
must competitors be injured, but competition itself must be injured by the conduct.228
The plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct “threatens the [second] market with
the higher prices or reduced output or quality associated with the kind of monopoly
that is ordinarily accompanied by a large market share.” 229 In addition to the
elements the plaintiff must put forth, there are substantial exceptions looming over
the successful claim of monopoly leveraging. As stated in Berkey Photo,
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a large firm does not violate Section 2 simply by reaping the competitive
rewards attributable to its efficient size, nor does an integrated business
offend the Sherman Act whenever one of its departments benefits from
association with a division possessing a monopoly in its own market. So
long as we allow a firm to compete in several fields, we must expect it to
seek the competitive advantages of its broad-based activity—more
efficient production, greater ability to develop complementary products,
reduced transaction costs, and so forth. These are gains that accrue to any
integrated firm, regardless of its market share, and they cannot by
themselves be considered uses of monopoly power.230
Courts have additionally stated, “it is not unlawful for an existing firm, entering a
new product market, to promote its product by touting the benefits afforded by that
product’s association with the firm. Nor it is unlawful for employees of one division
of a firm to promote products produced by another division.”231 These exceptions
demonstrate that courts view anticompetitive conduct with caution. Courts are
reluctant to find anticompetitive violations when evidence suggests that firms are
reaping benefits from efficient business practices.
Finally, a successful application of the doctrine may further be limited to cases in
which the plaintiff can also successfully bring a tying action. 232 Though not
expressly stated, tying may have been a requirement for successfully bringing a
cause of action in monopoly leveraging since Berkey Photo. Berkey Photo involved
a tying action and it was the first and one of the few instances where a plaintiff
succeeded in bringing a cause of action for monopoly leveraging.233 Tying occurs
when a firm only sells product one, the “tying product,” if the consumer purchases
product two, the “tied product.” 234 Therefore, a firm engages in both tying and
monopoly leveraging when, as in Berkey Photo, it uses its monopoly power in the
product 1 market to gain an advantage in the product 2 market by only selling
product 2 if the consumer also purchases product 1. 235 When a plaintiff can
successfully bring an action for tying, it greatly strengthens its monopoly leveraging
claim because all of the requirements for monopoly leveraging fall in place,
assuming plaintiff indeed had monopoly power in market 1.236
V. VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC. V. LAW OFFICES OF CURTIS V. TRINKO, LLP
The Supreme Court has the opportunity to draw a clear line for anticompetitive
behavior violative of the Sherman Act through its ruling in Verizon. Because a
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circuit split exists, and the Court has offered conflicting statements on the cause of
action, it must ameliorate the confusion.
In Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atlantic Corp.,237 the plaintiff
class member, who was a local phone service customer of AT&T, appealed the
dismissal of its class action. 238 AT&T provided the local phone service to the
plaintiff by purchasing access to the local telephone network from Bell Atlantic, now
known as Verizon Communications, Inc. 239
The case involved the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which required Bell Atlantic, having a lawful
monopoly in the local phone service market, to give AT&T and its other competitors
equal access to its local network, for purposes of allowing them to compete.240 The
plaintiff brought an action against Bell Atlantic alleging that it was damaged when
Bell Atlantic refused to give AT&T equal access to its local network.241 The plaintiff
alleged that Bell Atlantic refused to give AT&T equal access because AT&T
received sub-par local phone service from Bell South.242 Bell South filled its own
customers’ orders before the customers of AT&T, did not fill AT&T’s customers’
orders timely enough, sometimes failed to fill them at all, and additionally failed to
provide AT&T with information regarding the status of its customers orders.243 The
plaintiffs alleged that “Bell Atlantic's conduct had no valid business reason and was
intended to exclude competition from the market ‘by making it difficult for its
competitors to provide service in the Local Phone Service market on the level that
Bell Atlantic is able to provide to its customers in that market.’”244 For its monopoly
leveraging claim, the plaintiff alleged that Bell South used its monopoly power in the
wholesale market, where it sold access to its local telephone network to AT&T, to
gain a competitive advantage in the retail market, where it sells its own local
telephone service to its customers.245
Although the district court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss without
considering the plaintiff’s monopoly leveraging claim, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.246 The Court
of Appeals stated, “the plaintiff may have a monopoly leveraging claim” and further
explained that the plaintiff successfully alleged the three elements of the claim;247
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namely, that Bell South possessed a monopoly power in the wholesale market, that
Bell South used that power to gain a competitive advantage in the retail market, and
that the plaintiff suffered an injury due to Bell South’s conduct.248
The Court of Appeals made its decision not only by following precedent on the
monopoly leveraging doctrine in the Third Circuit, but also after plaintiffs set forth
arguments in its motion for reconsideration 249 based upon a treatise written by
Professors Phillip E. Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp regarding monopoly
leveraging. 250 Professors Areeda and Herbert recognize the cause of action for
monopoly leveraging; however, they would limit its application to conduct that
“threatens the [second] market with the higher prices or reduced output or quality
associated with the kind of monopoly that is ordinarily accompanied by a large
market share.”251 Although this helps the plaintiffs in Bell South, as they alleged
what Professors Areeda and Herbert require, it raises the bar for anticompetitive
monopoly leveraging conduct. This standard requires monopolistic effects in the
secondary market, not just a competitive advantage.252
On November 1, 2002, Verizon Communications Inc., formally known as Bell
South, petitioned for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court.253 Since Verizon’s
filing of the petition, the United States Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission have expressed their opinions on the monopoly leveraging doctrine.
The DOJ and FTC argue against the validity of the monopoly leveraging doctrine
and in favor of Verizon.254 The DOJ and FTC state that monopoly leveraging theory
“countenances an antitrust violation unsupported by the Sherman Act’s text and
fundamental antitrust principles.”255 As argued in Alaska Airlines, the DOJ and FTC
argue for a literal interpretation of the Sherman Act, which allows only for causes of
action in monopolization and attempted monopolization, and not one for gaining a
competitive advantage with monopoly power. The DOJ and FTC note the Court’s
decision in Spectrum Sports,256 which held that Section 2 “makes the conduct of a
single firm unlawful only when it actually monopolizes or dangerously threatens to
do so.”257 Furthermore, the DOJ and FTC state that monopoly leveraging “does not
248
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require the monopolist’s conduct to be ‘exclusionary’ or ‘predatory’ within the
meaning of Section 2 jurisprudence.”258
VI. HOW THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD RULE
The Supreme Court should raise the bar for actionable monopoly leveraging
conduct violative of the Sherman Act. The Court should only recognize conduct that
either leads to a monopoly, attempted monopoly or monopolistic effects in a second
market, and eliminate as actionable, behavior that leads to competitive advantage in
the second market. To do this, the Court should recognize that there are three types
of monopoly leveraging as previously discussed in this article. 259 Because the
concept of leveraging can result based on three types of conduct, recognizing them
would make it useful for characterizing the precise behavior exhibited by a firm as
either violative of the Sherman Act, or not.
If a firm uses its monopoly power in one market to acquire a monopoly in the
second market, it has engaged in the highest degree of monopoly leveraging:
unlawful monopolization through monopoly leveraging. 260 Moving down the
spectrum of anticompetitive behavior, if a firm uses its monopoly power in one
market to attempt to gain a monopoly in the second market, it has engaged in
unlawful attempted monopolization through monopoly leveraging.261 If a firm uses
its monopoly power in one market to gain a competitive advantage in the second
market, however, the firm has engaged in lawful competitive behavior through
monopoly leveraging.
The Court must draw the line for anticompetitive behavior violative of the
Sherman Act above the third type of conduct, where the firm merely gains a
competitive advantage in the second market. The line, however, should not be as
high as the Ninth and Third Circuit courts would proclaim. In other words, it should
not fall immediately below the second type of conduct: attempted monopolization
through monopoly leveraging. The line should be high enough to make lawful the
gain of a competitive advantage in the second market, but low enough to allow for
one exception. Namely, conduct that “threatens the [second] market with the higher
prices or reduced output or quality associated with the kind of monopoly that is
ordinarily accompanied by a large market share” would be conduct that qualifies as
monopoly leveraging. 262 Professors Areeda and Herbert recognize the excepted
monopoly leveraging cause of action with this type of outcome in the second market
because this standard requires monopolistic effects in the secondary market, not just
a competitive advantage.263 It makes sense to allow this exception because it would
limit those who could allege the cause of action to firms impacted by unlawful
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monopolistic effects in the second market, thereby barring those firms who simply
felt affects of competition to have a cause of action.264
The arguments against the unlawfulness of a mere gain of a competitive
advantage in a second market through monopoly leveraging persuasively warrant
this outcome. Most persuasive is the Supreme Court’s decision in Spectrum Sports,
where the Court took a literal approach in interpreting the Sherman Act by holding
that Section 2 “makes the conduct of a single firm unlawful only when it actually
monopolizes or dangerously threatens to do so.”265
Unfortunately for the doctrine, there is no persuasive reason why it should exist.
The best argument was given in Eastman Kodak, where the Court stated that it “has
held many times that power gained through some natural and legal advantage such as
a patent, copyright, or business acumen can give rise to liability if ‘a seller exploits
his dominant position in one market to expand his empire into the next.’”266 The
Court, however, would likely discredit this argument for two reasons. First, Kodak
willfully used its monopoly power in the parts market to increase its monopoly share
in the service market.267 Therefore, Kodak did more than merely gain a competitive
advantage in the second market. 268 Second, any confusion created by Eastman
Kodak was resolved the following year in Spectrum Sports.
There are two final reasons for finding that the mere gain of a competitive
advantage in the second market is not a violation of the Sherman Act. First, even in
the courts that have accepted the doctrine, few plaintiffs have succeeded on the
merits.269 Second, history has already relegated the monopoly leveraging doctrine to
the status of a throw-in cause of action: it does not cost the plaintiff an additional fee
to add it to the complaint. However, once it is there, it imposes costs on the parties
and the court in responding to it and dealing with the confusion it entails.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Court should draw the line for anticompetitive behavior violative of the
Sherman Act above the mere gain of a competitive advantage in the second market.
If the Supreme Court were to draw the line at this level, the circuit split and the
resulting confusion would be ameliorated. By recognizing the three types of conduct
that characterize monopoly leveraging, with the exception to the third type of
conduct, the Supreme Court would provide much needed guidance for the lower
federal courts in determining whether a firm’s behavior in a given case rises to the
level of the monopoly leveraging. The lower federal courts would have to examine
three situations when presented with a monopoly leveraging cause of action: (1)
whether monopolization occurred in the second market through leveraging, (2)
whether attempted monopolization in the second market occurred through
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leveraging, or (3) whether the leveraging produced “higher prices or reduced output
or quality associated with the kind of monopoly that is ordinarily accompanied by a
large market share” 270 in the second market. A clear pronouncement from the
Supreme Court would not only help federal judges, but potential plaintiffs as well,
leading ultimately to judicial economy. Those contemplating bringing a cause of
action for monopoly leveraging would have guideposts by which to measure the
facts of their case against to determine whether the conduct at issue is within the
spectrum of actionable conduct. The waters that surround monopoly leveraging have
been murky ever since the inception of the doctrine in 1948 in Eastman Kodak.271
Through Verizon, the Supreme Court has the opportunity to clear the waters once
and for all.
ANTHONY J. LAZZARO
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